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I. INTRODUCTION
Raised in Portsmouth, New Hampshire by middle-class parents, 27-year-old
“Adam Moser was popular, adventurous, athletic, a college grad, a top fisherman
and a World War II history buff who fluently spoke French.”1 A football star
with the Exeter High School Blue Hawks, Moser excelled academically and
earned his degree in Actuarial Science from Temple University in 2011. After
college, he appeared on “Wicked Tuna, a reality television series featured by
National Geographic, and earned a small degree of fame and fortune from the
opportunity.”2 By all accounts, Moser had a loving family, kind friends, and a
promising life. On September 19, 2015, much to the horror of his parents and
loved ones, Moser unexpectedly passed away. Autopsy reports revealed a
disturbing cause of death. Moser had self-injected a substance that he believed
at the time of his purchase to be heroin, but what was actually its sinister cousin:
synthetic fentanyl. This misunderstanding cost him his life.
The story of Adam Moser relates just one among the thousands of
heartbreaking realities brought on by America’s opioid epidemic. From

* Candidate for Juris Doctor, Notre Dame Law School, 2021. I would like to thank my brother, parents,
classmates, and friends for encouraging me in my calling to become a lawyer. Thanks to Professor
Jimmy Gurulé for his valuable feedback and my colleagues on the Notre Dame Journal of International
and Comparative Law for their diligent editing assistance. Finally, a very special thanks to my former
supervisors Katie Crytzer and Tim Goobic for inspiring me to further study the opioid crisis during my
2019 summer clerkship at the U.S. Department of Justice. All errors are my own.
1 DEA-360 Online, True Story: Adam Moser 27, Portsmouth, N.H., Fentanyl, JUST THINK TWICE (2015),
https://www.justthinktwice.gov/manchester/true-stories/true-story-adam-moser-27-portsmouth-nhfentanyl.
2 Id.
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teenagers in high school hallways3 to celebrities idolized in popular culture,4 this
crisis does not discriminate among the communities it ravages. Moser’s story
also offers anecdotal support for the fact that opioid abuse remains a dire public
health emergency and has visited destruction upon American5 and international
populations alike.6 The current epidemic developed in three waves: “[t]he first
wave was prescription opioids, the second wave was heroin, and the third—and
ongoing—wave is synthetic opioids.”7 The unrivaled lethality of this final wave,
and the rate at which it has accelerated, shocks the conscience.8 A 2018 study in
the Health Policy Review conducted by six physicians explains:
Data on opioid overdose deaths shows 42,000 deaths in 2016.
Of these, synthetic opioids other than methadone were
responsible for over 20,000, heroin for over 15,000, and
natural and semi-synthetic opioids other than methadone
responsible for over 14,000. Fentanyl deaths increased 520%
from 2009 to 2016 (increased by 87.7% annually between
2013 and 2016), and heroin deaths increased 533% from 2000
to 2016.9
The high potency of synthetic opioids, chief among them illicitly
manufactured fentanyl (“IMF”)10 and their near-identical cousins known as
fentanyl analogues, places them in a class all their own within the opioid family
of narcotics.11 Between IMF and its analogues, the latter contributed most to the
3 See, e.g., Benjamin Romano & Brendan Kiley, ‘Fentanyl is a Death Drug’: Public-Health Warning
Issued After Pills Kill 3 Local Teens, SEATTLE TIMES (Oct. 5, 2019, 11:23 AM),
https://www.seattletimes.com/seattle-news/health/schools-issue-warning-after-seattle-teen-diesfrom-fentanyl-laced-pill/ (explaining that three high school teenagers in Seattle fatally overdosed on
pills laced with illicit fentanyl, which they believed to be oxycodone).
4 See, e.g., Daniella Silva, Prince Died After Taking Fake Vicodin Laced with Fentanyl, NBC NEWS,
(Apr. 19, 2018, 5:36 PM), https://www.nbcnews.com/news/us-news/no-criminal-charges-prince-soverdose-death-prosecutor-announces-n867491 (“Music legend Prince died after taking what he
thought was Vicodin but was actually a counterfeit painkiller that was laced with fentanyl . . . ‘In all
likelihood, Prince had no idea he was taking a counterfeit pill that could kill him’. . .”).
5 See THE WHITE HOUSE, Ending America’s Opioid Crisis (2018), https://www.whitehouse.gov/opioids/
(declaring a public health emergency because 64,000 Americans died from opioid overdoses in 2016).
6 See WORLD HEALTH ORG., Information Sheet on Opioid Overdose (Aug. 28, 2020),
https://www.who.int/substance_abuse/information-sheet/en/ (declaring that in 2016 275 million
people worldwide used drugs, 34 million of those used opioids, 27 million suffered from opioid abuse
disorders (addiction), and 450,000 died from a direct result of drug overdoses).
7 BRYCE PARDO ET AL., THE FUTURE OF FENTANYL AND OTHER SYNTHETIC OPIOIDS, RAND Corp. xv
(2019).
8 See Leo Beletsky & Corey Davis, Today’s Fentanyl Crisis: Prohibition’s Iron Law Revisited, 46 INT’L
J. DRUG POL’Y 156 (2017).
9 Laxmaiah Manchikanti et al., Reframing the Prevention Strategies of the Opioid Crisis: Focusing on
Prescription Opioids, Fentanyl, and Heroin Epidemic, 20 HEALTH POL’Y REV. 309 (2018) (emphasis
added).
10 This Note addresses the need to combat illicit fentanyl from a law enforcement perspective.
Contrariwise, licit fentanyl, as prescribed and administered by licensed medical practitioners consistent
with their best practices, finds no criticism here. See What is Fentanyl, CENTER FOR DISEASE CONTROL
AND PREVENTION (2019), https://www.cdc.gov/drugoverdose /opioids/fentanyl.html (“. . . the sharp
rise in fentanyl-related deaths may be due to increased availability of illegally made, nonpharmaceutical fentanyl, and not prescribed fentanyl.”).
11 See The Countdown: Fentanyl Analogues & The Expiring Emergency Scheduling Order: Hearing
Before the Comm. on the Judiciary U.S. Sen., 116 Cong. 1 (2019) (statement by Amanda Liskamm,
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recent spike in opioid overdose deaths.12 These analogues, primarily concocted
by chemists overseas, eventually find their way to American shores through
international narcotrafficking channels. According to the U.S. Department of
Justice (“DOJ” or “Main Justice”), “China is the principal source country of
fentanyl-like substances and other synthetic opioids, producing most illicit
fentanyl and fentanyl-like substances that reach U.S. users.”13 Nonetheless,
current efforts to hold China accountable for turning a blind eye to fentanyl
diversion have largely failed.
Despite reinvigorated efforts by the DEA to quell domestic distribution of
IMF and its analogues, the United States cannot make lasting progress in
counternarcotics without international cooperation.14 Consequently, an effective
strategy to combat the opioid crisis must be international in scope and tailored
to address IMF and analogue trafficking from their primary source: Chinese
manufacturers. Therefore, although the Trump Administration has won a series
of praiseworthy battles in what has become a years-long war against the
proliferation of illegal opiates, its victories should spur additional action rather
than apathy.15

Counsel, U.S. Dep’t of Justice) (“The lethality of fentanyl is virtually unmatched. It is 30-50 times
more potent than heroin, which is quite lethal in its own right.”); Rachel L. Rothberg & Kate Stith,
Fentanyl: A Whole New World, 46 J. L. MED. & ETHICS 314 (2018) (“Fentanyl . . . is fifty times more
potent than heroin and one hundred times more so than morphine. It is so dangerous that . . . first
responders who unknowingly come into contact with it . . . can be put at serious risk.”). See also Erika
Kinetz & Paisley Dodds, Deadly Drug Fentanyl Has Been Tested as Chemical Weapon by Military for
Decades, GLOBAL NEWS, (Oct. 8, 2016, 11:16 AM), https://globalnews.ca/news/2991712/deadlydrug-fentanyl-has-been-tested- as-chemical-weapon-by-military-for-decades/.
12 See Harold E. Schueler, Emerging Synthetic Fentanyl Analogs, ACADEMIC FORENSIC PATHOLOGY
(2017) (“Synthetic fentanyl analogs are the most potent substances to enter the illicit drug market.”).
See also Lawrence Scholl et al., Drug and Opioid-Involved Opioid Deaths—United States, 2013-2017,
67
MORBIDITY
&
MORTALITY
WEEKLY
REPORT
1419
(2018),
https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC6334822/pdf/mm675152e1.pdf (“From 2016 to
2017, overdose deaths involving all opioids and synthetic opioids increased, but deaths involving
prescription opioids and heroin remained stable. The opioid overdose epidemic continues to worsen
and evolve because of the continuing increase in deaths involving synthetic opioids.”).
13 Liskamm, supra note 11, at 5. See also Liz Schrayer, We Can’t Fight Our Opioid Crisis Alone. We
Need Help from Countries Around the World, USA TODAY (Aug. 2, 2018, 2:11 PM),
https://www.usatoday.com/story/opinion/2018/08/02/fighting-american-opioid-crisis-internationalhelp-needed-column/850333002/ (“Most fentanyl in America comes from China.”); Illicit Supply of
Fentanyl and Other Synthetic Opioids: Transitioning Markets and Evolving Challenges: Testimony
Before the Comm. on Homeland Sec. Subcomm. on Intelligence and Counterterrorism and Subcomm.
on Border Sec., Facilitation, and Operations, 116th Cong. 9 (2018) (statement by Bryce Pardo, RAND
Corp.) (“Currently, U.S. authorities believe China to be the primary source for fentanyl, fentanyl
analogues, precursor chemicals, and press machines used in the manufacture of counterfeit tablets.”).
See also Alex W. Palmer, The China Connection, N.Y. TIMES (last updated Oct. 24, 2019),
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/10/16/magazine/china-fentanyl-drug-ring.html (“China remains the
center of the global fentanyl economy”).
14 Schrayer, supra note 13 (“When it comes to combating the opioid epidemic, we simply don’t have the
luxury of battling this crisis on the homefront alone.”); See also Christopher Battiloro, Note, Fentanyl:
How China’s Pharmaceutical Loopholes are Fueling the Opioid Crisis, 46 SYRACUSE J. INT’L L. &
COM. 343-44 (2019) (“The root of the opioid crisis lies in China, where synthetic opioids and their
precursors are manufactured before being shipped overseas. While some changes are being made
domestically, thanks to the internet, this issue has no borders and cannot be unilaterally controlled.”).
15 See Manchikanti et al., supra note 9, at 317 (“In recent years, prescription opioid usage has decreased
with the development of a multitude of federal, state, and local regulations.”). But see Jeffrey Miron,
Greg Sollenberger & Laura Nicolae, Overdosing on Regulation: How Government Caused the Opioid
Epidemic, THE CATO INST. (2019), (explaining opioid prescription regulations pushed consumers to
black market dealers at their peril and suggests “that the United States should scale back restrictions
on opioid prescribing, perhaps to the point of legalization.”).
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This Note addresses the international legal landscape of the opioid
epidemic, specifically illicit transboundary trafficking of fentanyl and fentanyl
analogues from chemists in China into the hands of American consumers. First,
it assesses the seriousness of the opioid crisis, as exacerbated by emerging
threats posed by IMF and related analogues. Second, it offers an explanative
account of current domestic law enforcement efforts to address fentanyl by the
United States and China respectively. This explanation precedes a short
discussion that relates the successes and failures of each regime in their efforts
to combat narcotrafficking. Third, this Note evaluates the inability of extant
multinational drug conventions to effectively address transboundary fentanyl
trafficking from China. Finally, it proposes that the United States and China
adopt a bilateral self-executing treaty that would class-wide schedule IMF and
its analogues consistent with the policy announced by China in May 2019 and
as advocated by counsel at the DOJ. This Note contends that such a proposal
would grant the DOJ new jurisdiction to prosecute known Chinese chemists who
divert synthetic opioids into the global trafficking rings that distribute them to
Americans.
II. BACKGROUND
Although opioid abuse has existed for several decades, the recent escalation
in opioid addiction began after influential pharmaceutical companies prevailed
in their campaign to bring opiate painkillers to medical facilities in the 1990s.16
According to the National Institute on Drug Abuse (“NIDA”), opioids primarily
affect areas of the brain that control pleasure, pain, and emotion, and they
stimulate dopamine releases responsible for the euphoria experienced by
recreational users.17 These experiences inevitably become less satisfying as the
brain acclimates to the drug over time.18 Consequently, users will crave stronger
doses with continued opioid use and eventually become addicted.19 A linear
trajectory exists between individuals who become addicted to prescription
painkillers (acquired licitly by prescription or illicitly through diversion) and
those addicted to illegal opiates. Indeed, prescription opioid abuse often
precedes an addiction to heroin20 and, if allowed to progress, synthetic opioids

16 See U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH AND HUM. SERVS., What is the U.S Opioid Epidemic? (last updated Sept.
4, 2019), https://www.hhs.gov/opioids/about-the-epidemic/index.html (explaining big pharmaceutical
companies “reassured the medical community that patients would not become addicted to opiate pain
relievers” which precipitated a rise in prescriptions and, accordingly, more cases of addiction).
17 See NAT’L INST. ON DRUG ABUSE, How Do Opioids Affect the Brain and Body (last visited Nov. 23,
2019),
https://www.drug
abuse.gov/publications/misuse-prescription-drugs/what-classesprescription-drugs-are-commonly-misused (“When [opiates] attach to their receptors, they inhibit the
transmission of pain signals. Opioids can also produce . . . nausea, constipation, and respiratory
depression, and since these drugs also act on brain regions involved in reward, they can induce
euphoria, particularly when they are taken at a higher-than-prescribed dose . . .”).
18 Id.
19 See generally E. Salsitz & T. Wiegand, Pharmacotherapy of Opioid Addiction: Putting a Real Face
on a False Demon, 12 J. MED. TOXICOLOGY 58-63 (2016).
20 See Shelby Leheny, The Connection Between Prescription Opioids and Heroin, PHARMACY TIMES
(Sept. 12, 2016, 6:46 AM), https://www.pharmacytimes.com/contributor/shelby-leheny-pharmdcandidate-2017/2016/09/the-connection-between-prescription-opioids-and-heroin
(pharmacist
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like fentanyl and its analogues.21 Therefore, some scholars have attributed
America’s high demand for IMF to recent spikes in opioid prescriptions.22
Before IMF and its analogues can be sold domestically and consumed,
they must be manufactured, diverted, and—in most cases—internationally
trafficked. According to the DEA, the “vast majority” of IMF originates with
licensed chemists in China.23 Many of these suppliers are gainfully employed at
legitimate taxpaying chemical companies, many of which receive praise from
the Chinese government.24 These entities divert large quantities of fentanyl and
drug ‘precursors’—substances used to enhance or create narcotics—into the
hands of dark web retailers.25 Ben Westhoff describes transactions in these
forums as “shockingly easy” to negotiate.26 Westhoff, an investigative journalist,
disguised himself under an online alias and contacted several Chinese sellers on
the dark web about purchasing underground fentanyl. These chemists replied
promptly and were notably “well-accustomed to Western buyers, who are the
bulk of their clients.”27 Once concocted in China, IMF can be trafficked into the
United States through a variety of mediums. Mexican cartels28 and postal

explaining that “[r]esearch has proven a connection between opioid abuse and heroin use.”); BEN
WESTHOFF, FENTANYL, INC.: HOW ROGUE CHEMISTS ARE CREATING THE DEADLIEST WAVE OF THE
OPIOID EPIDEMIC 145 (2019) (explaining that “when people’s OxyContin supplies ran out, they turned
to heroin”).
21 See Leslie Cooley Dismukes, How Did We Get Here? Heroin and Fentanyl Trafficking Trends: A Law
Enforcement Perspective, 79 N.C. MED. J. 181-83 (2017) (explaining how a rise in prescription opioids
precipitated a demand for heroin and later fentanyl in North Carolina). See generally Nabarun
Dasgupta, Leo Beletsky & Daniel Ciccarone, Opioid Crisis: No Easy Fix to Its Social and Economic
Determinants, 108 A.J.P.H. PERSPECTIVES 182-84 (2018) (explaining the opioid crisis in three phases:
over-prescription of opiate painkillers, heroin abuse, and fentanyl).
22 Id. at 181-82.
23 Tackling Fentanyl: The China Connection: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Africa, Global Health,
Global Hum. Rts. and Int’l Orgs., 116th Cong. 2 (2018) (statement by Paul Knierim, Deputy Chief of
Operations at the Office of Global Enforcement, U.S. DEA) (“Over the past several years, DEA has
identified numerous illicit fentanyl class substances and hundreds of synthetic drugs from at least eight
different drug classes, the vast majority of which are manufactured in China.”). See also Fentanyl
Crisis: Is China a Major Source of Illegal Drugs?, BBC NEWS (Sept. 23, 2018),
https://www.bbc.com/news/world-45564744 (quoting DEA spokeswoman Katherine Pfaff who
explained that counternarcotic intelligence indicates a “significant amount of [IMF] comes from
China.”). See Dismukes, supra note 21, at 183 (“Clandestinely produced fentanyl and its analogues
originate in China.”).
24 See WESTHOFF, supra note 20, at 168 (explaining, that in addition to Chinese shadow supply
enterprises, other chemical companies which supply fentanyl to dark markets “have been able to
operate in the open . . . in China for years. They pay their taxes and occasionally receive plaudits from
the government.”).
25 Rothberg & Stith, supra note 11, at 317 (explaining use of online dark markets by Chinese chemists
to proliferate IMF).
26 WESTHOFF, supra note 20, at 171.
27 Id.
28 See Josh Meyer, What are Mexican Drug Cartels Fighting Over? The Chance to Sell Fentanyl Here,
WASH. POST (Nov. 7, 2019, 6:00 AM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/outlook/2019/11/07/whatare-mexican-drug-cartels-fighting-over-chance-sell-fentanyl-here/ (“More recently, according to
DEA, CDC and United Nations data, the cartels have been spiking their U.S.-bound cocaine,
methamphetamine and counterfeit pain pills with fentanyl, too, to pack a bigger punch and hook whole
new cadres of users.”). See Rothberg & Stith, supra note 11, at 316-17.

2021

BILATERAL RESPONSE TO THE PROLIFERATION OF FENTANYL

163

smuggling,29 often facilitated by digital dark markets,30 constitute the most
favored channels.
Were drug smuggling an Olympic sport, Mexican cartels would bring home
the gold. In fact, “Mexican drug cartels are the primary channel for Chinese
fentanyl destined for the U.S.”31 Already North America’s top supplier of illicit
heroin since the 1990s,32 “Mexican drug trafficking organizations are importing
fentanyl and fentanyl precursors from China.”33 These distributors capitalize on
the availability of Chinese fentanyl to handsomely profit at the peril of American
opioid addicts. “Synthetic opioids, which can be readily made in a lab, are
attractive alternatives to poppy-based heroin, which is susceptible to blight,
drought, eradication, and labor shortages. Also, the very high potency-to-weight
ratio of fentanyl makes it ideal for smuggling.”34 Moreover, “[f]entanyl is a
unique drug in several ways. The profit margin is remarkable: A $3,000
investment can produce $1,500,000 in earnings.”35 Consequently, Mexican
traffickers began to supplement—or “cut”—their heroin with synthetic fentanyl
and fentanyl analogues,36 a process which has enabled them to “stretch their
heroin supply and obtain a larger profit.”37 Known colloquially as “China
White,” fentanyl-heroin hybrids have proven themselves a deadly blend because
neither street dealers nor consumers appreciate their extraordinary potency.38

29 See Sari Horwitz & Scott Higham, The Flow of Fentanyl: In the Mail, Over the Border, WASH. POST
(Aug. 29, 2019), https://www.washingtonpost.com/investigations/2019/08/23/fentanyl-flowedthrough-us-postal-service-vehicles-crossing-southern-border/?arc404=true.
30 See Patil Armenian et al, Fentanyl, Fentanyl Analogs and Novel Synthetic Opioids: A Comprehensive
Review, 134 NEUROPHARMACOLOGY 121, 125 (2018) (“Modern internet e-commerce has enabled
individual players, small-scale drug trafficking organizations (DTOs) and largescale DTOs with their
own production facilities to flood the illicit drug market with fentanyl.”).
31 Id. at 126. See also Liskamm, supra note 11, at 1 (“Whether delivered via mail, express consignment,
or through Mexico, China is the principal source country of fentanyl-like substances and other
synthetic opioids, producing most illicit fentanyl and fentanyl-like substances that reach U.S. users.”).
32 See Sarah G. Mars, Daniel Rosenblum & Daniel Ciccarone, Illicit Fentanyls in the Opioid Street
Market: Desired or Imposed, 114 ADDICTION 780 (2018) (“Since the mid-1990s almost all US heroin
originated in Mexico and Colombia, but between 2000 and 2009, estimated Colombian production of
opium, the raw ingredient that is refined into heroin, fell by 90%. Meanwhile, estimated Mexican
opium production rose by more than 1900% from its low point in 2000 to dominate the US market,
with total production for the US market quadrupling. This rise was followed by a 46% decline in
combined estimated opium production in 2009–13, leading up to the current US fentanyl wave.”).
33 Pardo, supra note 13, at 9.
34 Id.
35 Hans A. von Spakovsky & Peyton Smith, China is Poisoning America with Fentanyl, THE HERITAGE
FOUND. (Mar. 5, 2019), https://www.heritage.org/crime-and-justice/commentary/china-poisoningamerica-fentanyl.
36 Knierim, supra note 23, at 1 (“Once in the Western Hemisphere, fentanyl or its analogues are prepared
for mixing into the heroin supply. . . and then moved into the illicit U.S. market where demand for
prescription opioids and heroin remains at epidemic proportions.”).
37 Dismukes, supra note 21, at 183.
38 Katarzynac Kuczyńska et al., Abuse of Fentanyl: An Emerging Problem to Face, 289 FORENSIC SCI.
INT’L 207, 212 (2018) (“Recent years have seen an unpreceded increase in fentanyl-related
intoxications, some fatal, in various parts of the world, but notably in North America. The majority
have been attributed to the use of heroin laced with illicit fentanyl, a far more potent opioid. Some
users are unaware of this adulteration, thus the risk of overdose and poisoning is very high.”). See also
Maggie Fox, Why Would Anyone Cut Heroin with Fentanyl? It’s Cheap, These Researchers Say, NBC
NEWS (Dec. 4, 2018, 5:45 PM), https://www.nbcnews.com/storyline/americas-heroin-epidemic/whywould-anyone-cut-heroin-fentanyl-it-s-cheap-these-n943796 (“Drug overdose deaths are skyrocketing
. . . [and] are caused by synthetic opioids such as fentanyl. These lab-made drugs can be very potent
and they are increasingly showing up in supplies of drugs that buyers believed were heroin. Because
the fentanyl and related drugs are so powerful, it’s easy to overdose. That’s why so many users die.”).
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Chinese chemists also interact directly with American consumers and street
dealers through dark web forums and crypto markets.39 In fact, “almost 70
percent of fentanyl seized by C[ustoms and] B[order] P[atrol] in FY 2018 arrived
by air, mostly at mail and express consignment carrier facilities.”40 According
to DEA, “[f]rom China, [IMF] substances are shipped primarily through express
consignment carriers or international mail directly to the United States. . .”41
Investigative journalist Scott Higham and Sari Horwitz, his Pulitzer Prize
winning colleague, explained this process clearly in early 2019:
Chinese drug traffickers had some advice for American buyers
of fentanyl: Let us ship it to you by regular mail. It might be
slower than FedEx or UPS, but the opioid is much more likely
to reach its destination through the U.S. Postal Service. These
cyber drug dealers wrote their U.S.-based customers—in
emails later uncovered by federal investigators—that private
delivery companies electronically tracked packages, allowing
the easy identification of mail from suspect addresses and
creating a bright trail connecting sellers and buyers of illegal
fentanyl.42
The high potency of illicit fentanyl and its analogues—to the tune of 500
lethal doses in a parcel the size of a sugar packet—“means it can be smuggled
through the mail in what officials call micro-shipments that are far harder to
identify and interdict than bulkier loads of heroin, cocaine or marijuana.”43
These facts, combined with concerted efforts by Chinese chemists to conceal
their drug diversion schemes, illustrate the formidable challenge posed by opioid
smuggling for U.S. customs and postal enforcement.44 Somewhat ironically,
China cracks down on illicitly distributed fentanyl domestically, yet tacitly

39 See generally Usha Lokala, et. al, Global Trends, Local Harms: Availability of Fentanyl-Type Drugs
on the Dark Web and Accidental Overdoses in Ohio, 25 COMPUTATIONAL AND MATHEMATICAL ORG.
THEORY 48-59 (2018) (examining correlations between advertising for the sale of IMF on dark cryptomarkets and increased presence of IMF in the United States). But see Mars, et al., supra note 32, at
777 (explaining that crypto markets are unlikely to contribute to significant amounts of fentanyl
entering the United States).
40 Pardo, supra note 13, at 6.
41 Knierim, supra note 23, at 1. See Palmer, supra note 13 (“The Postal Service suddenly became perhaps
the largest drug-transportation network in the world, delivering fentanyl from China straight to
American homes. Catching an illicit shipment in transit was nearly impossible.”).
42 Horwitz & Higham, supra note 29.
43 Del Quentin Wilbur, Fentanyl Smuggled from China is Killing Thousands of Americans, L.A. TIMES
(Oct. 19, 2018, 3:00 AM), https://www.latimes.com/politics/la-na-pol-china-fentanyl-20181019story.html; Spakovsky & Smith, supra note 35 (“A laboratory-made drug, fentanyl requires less time
and space to produce than its agricultural counterpart, heroin. Chemists can manufacture fentanyl in
small labs and use easy shipment methods.”).
44 Pardo, supra note 13, at 7 (“To avoid detection by customs authorities, Chinese producers or
distributors often use technically legal workarounds and, when necessary, outright deception.”). See
also Meyer, supra note 28 (“Massive amounts of fentanyl are being seized at the border now, and far
more is getting through. Thomas Overacker, executive director of cargo and conveyance security for
U.S. Customs and Border Protection, told Congress in July that seizures of illicit fentanyl had
significantly increased, from about two pounds in fiscal 2013 to about 2,170 pounds in fiscal 2018.
CBP had seized as much in the first half of 2019 as it did in all of the prior year, he said, but the agency
is able to inspect about 2 percent of cars and 16 percent of commercial vehicles that come across ports
of entry at the southwest border.”).
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permits its exportation to unsuspecting locations around the world.45 Therefore,
the Chinese government has not only allowed synthetic opioid proliferation, but
the regime’s lax enforcement policies have also enabled it.46
III. DOMESTIC EFFORTS AND LEGAL LANDSCAPE
A. THE UNITED STATES
The United States currently regulates fentanyl proper (excluding analogues)
as a Schedule II narcotic under the 1970 Controlled Substances Act (“CSA”).
The CSA, a law swiftly enforced by federal authorities and their international
partners, has been used to quash previous outbreaks of illicit fentanyl in the
United States before they could reach epidemic magnitude.47 The enumerated
classification of fentanyl as a controlled substance under Schedule II authorizes
DEA action. However, America’s opioid crisis has been fueled more by fentanyl
analogues than the original drug. While fentanyl itself has been permanently
scheduled as a controlled substance under the CSA, its analogues have only been
temporarily scheduled under Schedule I. Should Congress allow this temporary
scheduling order to lapse in May 2021, the legal authority under which analogue
traffickers may be prosecuted would no longer exist. As Amanda Liskamm,
counsel for the Director of the Opioid Prevention Unit of the Criminal Division
at the DOJ, explained to the U.S. Senate during the summer of 2019:
DEA expects savvy clandestine manufactures and traffickers
to respond to the reemerging gap in U.S. law by again
producing novel fentanyl-like substances. This is the normal
response of traffickers who wish to avoid prosecution and still
profit from peddling poison, and is consistent with previous
attempts to circumvent reactive substance-specific control
measures.48
Before Congress temporarily scheduled fentanyl analogues in 2020, DOJ
responded to “savvy clandestine manufacturers and traffickers” with an
emergency scheduling order in 2018.49 This order, as authorized by the 1984

45 WESTHOFF, supra note 20, at 170.
46 Spakovsky & Smith, supra note 35 (“China’s inadequate regulation of drugs has left room for an
estimated 160,000 chemical companies there with the ability to produce and export fentanyl.”). See
also WESTHOFF, supra note 20, at 206-208 (explaining how the Chinese government has conferred tax
incentives among other benefits upon chemical companies that facilitate proliferation of illicitly
manufactured fentanyl and fentanyl analogues).
47 Pardo, supra note 13, at 5 (“During a brief period in the mid-2000s, illicitly manufactured fentanyl
appeared in major heroin markets in the Midwest and mid-Atlantic, claiming about 1,000 lives. Federal
and local response was swift, expanding access to naloxone and seizing product from the street. In
May 2006, Mexican law enforcement and the DEA identified and closed the illicit manufacturing
operation in Toluca, Mexico. Illicitly manufactured fentanyl would not return to drug markets until
late 2013.”).
48 Liskamm, supra note 11, at 4-5.
49 Schedules of Controlled Substances: Temporary Placement of Fentanyl-Related Substances in
Schedule
I,
U.S.
DRUG
ENFORCEMENT
ADMIN.
(2018),
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Comprehensive Crime Control Act,50 temporarily scheduled fentanyl analogues
as Schedule I controlled substances and granted DOJ authority to prosecute
traffickers until May 2021.51
Pursuant to this emergency order, the United States introduced a variety of
measures to address transboundary IMF trafficking that included heightened law
enforcement efforts coordinated by the DOJ. This crackdown enjoyed relative
success. For example, the DOJ announced in 2018 a series of darknet website
seizures that forestalled efforts of domestic IMF dealers and consumers to
purchase illegal opioids and, in 2019, the DEA prosecuted a Chinese IMF ring;
the latter event illuminated the scale and seriousness of international fentanyl
trafficking while exposing the degree to which China has perpetuated the
ongoing opioid epidemic.52 Furthermore, “[t]he U.S. Postal Service (USPS) has
stepped up tracking, detection and interdiction efforts to curb fentanyl
trafficking into the U.S. through the mail [and] . . . witnessed a 1,000% increase
in the number of parcels seized containing synthetic opioids between 2016 and
2018.”53
Federal prosecutors across the United States have also ramped up their
efforts to prosecute fentanyl traffickers, thereby sending a strong message to
actual and would-be coconspirators that America will not sit idly while its
citizens are poisoned with IMF and associated analogues.54 Moreover, in 2017
the Trump Administration declared the opioid epidemic a National Health
Emergency, a title for which the crisis “unquestionably qualifies.”55 This
decision swept in a variety of benefits, including approval by the U.S. Food and

https://www.deadiversion.usdoj.gov/fed_regs/rules/2018/fr0206_4.htm. See Sarah N. Lynch, U.S.
House Passes Bill to Extend Temporary Ban on Fentanyl Look-Alikes for 15 Months, REUTERS (Jan.
29, 2020, 7:34 PM), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-congress-drugs/u-s-house-passes-bill-toextend-temporary-ban-on-fentanyl-look-alikes-for-15-months-idUSKBN1ZT01Z
(discussing
congressional adoption of a temporary class-wide schedule for fentanyl analogues, effective until May
2021).
50 See 21 U.S.C. § 811 (1980) (providing that the Attorney General may temporarily schedule substances
for a period of up to two years if he believes such action is appropriate and “necessary to avoid an
imminent hazard to the public safety.”).
51 The DEA called upon Congress to class-wide schedule all fentanyl analogues in 2020 because
temporary scheduling could launch the DOJ into uncharted territory regarding its pending prosecutions
under that authority. Without emergency scheduling, the DOJ would have to invoke the process
outlined in the Analogue Act for prosecution. This process has proven too resource intensive and time
consuming to effectively curtail the volatile fentanyl market. See Liskamm, supra note 11, at 4-6
(“Analogue Act prosecutions are time-consuming, resource-intensive, and difficult for investigators,
drug testing laboratories, prosecutors, courts, juries, and the entire criminal justice system.”).
52 First Nationwide Undercover Operation Targeting Darknet Vendors Results in Arrests of More Than
35 Individuals Selling Illicit Goods and the Seizure of Weapons, Drugs and More Than $23.6 Million,
U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE (June 26, 2018), https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/first-nationwide-undercoveroperation-targeting-darknet-vendors-results-arrests-more-35. Treasury Targets Chinese Drug
Kingpins Fueling America’s Deadly Opioid Crisis, U.S. DEP’T OF TREASURY (Aug. 21, 2019),
https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/sm756.
53 Celina Realuyo, Countering the Evolving Drug Trade in the Americas, WILSON CTR. 5 (Jan. 2020),
https://www.wilsoncenter.org/sites/default/files/media/uploads/documents/Countering%20the%20Ev
olving%20Drug%20Trade%20in%20the%20Americas.pdf.
54 See Benjamin Glassman, Justice Department Focus on Fentanyl Yields Results in Montgomery
County, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE (2019), https://www.atf.gov/news/pr/justice-department-focusfentanyl-yields-results-montgomery-county (explaining efforts by nine U.S. Attorneys across America
who participated in “Operation Synthetic Opioid Surge” which specifically targeted the distribution of
fentanyl and fentanyl-like substances pursuant to the DEA emergency scheduling order).
55 James Hodge, Jr., Sarah Wetter, et al., Redefining Public Health Emergencies: The Opioid Epidemic,
58 JURIMETRICS 15 (2017).
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Drug Administration (“FDA”) to authorize emergency use of Naxalone,
otherwise known as Narcan, a drug which can reverse the effects of an opioid
overdose, saving lives.56 “Absent a national emergency declaration, opioidrelated mortality may continue unabated, leading to continued loss of lives.”57
Accordingly, the national emergency declaration at least spotlighted the opioid
crisis in a new way that may have kickstarted life-saving reforms for real people
plagued by addiction.
America has also taken the fight against illicit fentanyl into the financial
arena. The “U.S. Department of the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control
(OFAC) and Treasury’s Financial Crimes Enforcement Network (FinCEN)
announced coordinated actions to bring additional financial pressure upon those
who manufacture, sell, or distribute synthetic opioids or their precursor
chemicals.”58 This approach has also enjoyed some success. For example, in
August 2018 OFAC “targeted a massive Chinese IMF trafficking network”
masterminded by the Zheng Family. The Zheng dynasty had a significant
influence, trafficking deadly fentanyl, fentanyl analogues, cannabinoids, and
cathinones to 37 U.S. States and 25 countries. Because the details of the Zheng
Drug Trafficking Organization (DTO) are essential to understanding its impact
and scope, a summary provided by the Department of Treasury has been
provided below:
Zheng DTO manufactures and distributes hundreds of
controlled substances, including fentanyl analogues such as
carfentanil, acetyl fentanyl, and furanyl fentanyl. Zheng
created and maintained numerous websites to advertise and
sell illegal drugs in more than 35 languages. The Zheng DTO
touted its ability to create custom-ordered drugs and avoid
detection from customs and law enforcement officials when
shipping the drugs through express mail and the U.S. Postal
Service. The Zheng DTO also used its chemical expertise to
create analogues of drugs with slightly different chemical
structures but the same or even more potent effect. The Zheng
DTO even agreed to manufacture adulterated cancer
medication, creating counterfeit pills that replaced the active
cancer-fighting ingredient with dangerous synthetic drugs.
The Zheng DTO laundered its drug proceeds in part by using
digital currency such as bitcoin, transmitted drug proceeds into
and out of bank accounts in China and Hong Kong, and
bypassed currency restrictions and reporting requirements.59
OFAC enabled federal law enforcement to crack down on this international
conspiracy and put an end to the Zheng enterprise. FinCEN has also proven a
valuable tool in America’s domestic efforts to quash the opioid epidemic
because it releases reports, formally known as “advisories”, that synthesize the
financial transactions of suspected chemists and traffickers. This information
56 Id.
57 Id. at 13.
58 TREASURY, supra note 52.
59 Id.
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may be used to identify patterns of suspicious behavior that can help federal
agents and prosecutors to identify perpetrators and bring them to justice. These
advisories, “which also serve[] as the monetary advisory on the financial aspects
of the illicit trafficking of fentanyl and synthetic opioids, provide information
relevant for financial institutions to gain a more comprehensive understanding
of the fentanyl crisis and take action to protect the homeland from this deadly
threat.”60 Therefore, the United States has in recent months taken comprehensive
efforts to combat the IMF crisis, both on the ground and in cyberspace.
B. CHINA
Motivated in part by a recent series of economic tariffs,61 China has taken
several steps to combat the opioid epidemic. First, effective May 1, 2019, China
class-wide scheduled fentanyl analogues, a policy shift that subjected purveyors
of IMF and similar substances to harsh prosecution by the Chinese
government.62 This decision arose amid unsuccessful efforts by the DOJ to
secure class-wide scheduling of fentanyl analogues in the United States,63 and
has been applauded by drug enforcement officials at the White House.64 Later,
in November 2019, China joined forces with the United States in an
unprecedented collaborative effort to prosecute nine perpetrators affiliated with
an IMF trafficking ring based in China.65
Second, the Chinese government has instituted new supervisory
measures for domestic narcotics distributors. “Following a tightening of drug
controls that took effect May 1, the [Chinese] government put 91 manufacturers
and 234 individual distributors under ‘strict supervision,’ warning them not to
export fentanyl or related drugs . . .”66 This heightened supervision has deterred
some illicit providers from trafficking IMF to potential international customers,
including prospective buyers in the United States.67 Moreover, China’s National
Narcotics Control Commission (“NNCC”), “reports that Chinese authorities
have arrested ‘dozens’ of synthetic drug exporters, confiscated eight illegal labs,

60 Id.
61 James Mayger & Zhe Huang, China Touts Fentanyl Convictions, Tackling Key Trade Talks Issue,
BLOOMBERG NEWS (Nov. 6, 2019, 9:56 PM), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2019-1107/china-punishes-fentanyl-smugglers-after-joint-probe-with-u-s.
62 Liskamm, supra note 11, at 1-2.
63 Id. at 3-5.
64 Tackling the Opioid Crisis: A Whole-of-Government Approach, Hearing Before the U.S. Sen. Comm.
on the Judiciary, 116 Cong. 12 (Dec. 17, 2019) (Statement by Kemp L. Chester, U.S. Office of Nat’l
Drug Control Pol’y), https://www.judiciary.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/Chester%20Testimony1.pdf.
65 Steven Jiang & Ben Wescott, China Sentences Fentanyl Drug Ring in Rare Public Trial Amid U.S.
Talks, CNN (Nov. 7, 2019, 10:52 PM), https://www.cnn.com/2019/11/07/asia/china-us-fentanyltrump-hebei-intl-hnk/index.html (“Thursday’s sentencing was presented as the culmination of the first
case China and the US had worked on together that led to a successful conviction.”). See also China
Sentences 9 in Fentanyl Trafficking Case After U.S. Tip, L.A. TIMES (Nov. 6, 2019, 11:00 PM),
https://www.latimes.com/world-nation/story/2019-11-06/china-sentences-fentanyl-us-tip.
66 Steven Lee Myers, China Cracks Down on Fentanyl. But Is It Enough to End the U.S. Epidemic?,
N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 1, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/12/01/world/asia/china-fentanylcrackdown.html.
67 Id. (explaining that some IMF distributors “claimed to be complying with the new rules banning the
overseas sale of synthetic opioids” while “[o]thers appeared to have shut down their operations,
disconnecting numbers which had previously reached salespeople offering to mail the drugs to the
United States.”).
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and seized about two tons of various psychoactive substances.”68 While China’s
attempt to crackdown on fentanyl trafficking has been considered a “positive
step” by the United States,69 claims of victory in the battle against Chinese drug
proliferation would be premature.70
Despite the efforts sketched above, this Note maintains “the measures
China has taken have had little to no impact on curbing illicit opioid
production.”71 China’s unilateral efforts have failed because they employ a
lackluster regulatory enforcement framework that enables licensed
pharmaceutical companies to divert fentanyl into illicit markets, circumventing
national protocols.72 Jeremy Haft, a professor at Georgetown University, has
determined China’s second-rate enforcement infrastructure fails to deter illicit
manufacturers because, when threatened with prosecution, illicit drug operations
simply “shut down quickly and disappear, only to open up again in another form
somewhere else.”73 As the U.S.-China Economic Review Commission
explained in its 2017 annual report:
Chinese law enforcement and drug investigators are unable to
effectively regulate the high volume of drugs and chemicals
the country produces. In many cases, the chemicals used to
produce fentanyl and fentanyl-like products are illegally
diverted from legitimate pharmaceutical uses, with criminals
taking advantage of inadequate enforcement protocols to
produce unregulated chemicals and [new psychoactive
substances].74
Consequently, unilateral efforts by China to confront distribution of IMF
will continue to fail until the regime overhauls its regulatory infrastructure. Until
that time, shrewd chemists will almost certainly continue to exploit China’s
clumsy anti-drug bureaucracy to export fentanyl and fentanyl analogues abroad
through illicit channels.75 Therefore, the current state of the opioid crisis presents

68 Associated Press, China Bans Drug So Deadly It’s Considered a Terrorist Threat, N.Y. POST (Feb.
16, 2017, 8:11 PM), https://nypost.com/2017/02/16/china-bans-drug-so-deadly-its-considered-aterrorist-threat/. Contra Battiloro, supra note 14, at 359 (“Chinese regulators have also obstructed the
United States’ ability to conduct drug inspections by delaying visa approvals for Federal Drug
Association (“FDA”) officials.”).
69 Jim Carroll, ONDCP Statement on Chinese Prosecution and Sentencing of Fentanyl Traffickers and
Producers,
U.S.
OFFICE
OF
DRUG
CONTROL
POL’Y
(Nov.
7,
2019),
https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefings-statements/ondcp-statement-chinese-prosecution-sentencingfentanyl-traffickers-producers/.
70 Myers, supra note 66 (“Experts and officials in the United States warned, however, that it was far too
soon to declare a victory in China’s fight against fentanyl.”).
71 Battiloro, supra note 14, at 351; Pardo, supra note 7, at 2 (“China’s export-led economic strategy and
lack of regulatory oversight have created favorable conditions for the production and exportation of
synthetic opioids and related chemicals.”) (emphasis added).
72 Battiloro, supra note 14, at 355-56.
73 David Ovalle & Jay Weaver, South Florida’s Source for Synthetic Drugs: The China Pipeline, MIAMI
HERALD
(last
updated
Nov.
20,
2015,
9:20
PM),
http://www.miamiherald.com/news/local/crime/article35417625.html.
74 Sean O’Connor, Fentanyl: China’s Deadly Export to the United States, U.S.-CHINA ECON. AND SEC.
REV. COMM. 8 (Feb. 1, 2017).
75 WESTHOFF, supra note 20, at 183-85.
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a unique opportunity for an international law remedy, ideally one informed by
drug enforcement entities in the United States and around the world.
IV. CURRENT LANDSCAPE OF INTERNATIONAL EFFORTS
International law, principally as established by the United Nations (“U.N.”),
has a reputation as “the cornerstone for domestic drug laws” in the United States,
China, and elsewhere.76 Its legal framework differs from domestic drug
enforcement because it binds nations, not individuals.77 The work of the U.N. in
this space originated with three global treaties that govern the Commission on
Narcotic Drugs (“CND”) and the International Narcotics Control Board
(“INCB”), as well as all nations that have ratified it.78 Although the first two
treaties established an international regulatory framework for narcotics, they
merely “include general provisions on illicit drug trafficking and drug abuse.”79
The U.N. would not expound on these provisions until 1988.80
First enacted in 1961, and amended in 1972, the Single Convention on
Narcotic Drugs marked the first serious international attempt to regulate
narcotics. It established a four-tiered drug schedule maintained by the INCB81
and commanded all signatories “to limit exclusively to medical and scientific
purposes the production, manufacture, export, import, distribution of, trade in,
use and possession of drugs.”82 184 nations joined the Convention, a decision
that required them to incorporate its provisions into their domestic laws.83
However, the flexibility afforded by the Convention’s non-self-executing design
undermined its purpose because member nations retained domestic legal

76 Naomi Burke-Shyne, Joanne Csete, et al., How Drug Control Policy and Practice Undermine Access
to Controlled Medicines, 19 HEALTH AND HUM. RTS. J. 238 (2017). See also G.A. Res. 66/183 (Apr.
3, 2012).
77 Robert Beck, International Law and International Relations, OXFORD RES. ENCYCLOPEDIAS (2018),
http://internationalstudies.oxfordre.com/view/10.1093/acrefore/9780190846626.001.0001/acrefore9780190846626-e-406?product=oreisa#acrefore-9780190846626-e-406-bibItem-21 (last visited Feb.
12, 2020).
78 UNITED NATIONS, Drug Trafficking, https://www.un.org/ruleoflaw/thematic-areas/transnationalthreats/drug-trafficking/ (last visited Feb. 02, 2020) (“The UN work in countering the world drug
problem is based on three major international drug control treaties, the Single Convention on Narcotic
Drugs of 1961 (as amended in 1972), the Convention on Psychotropic Substances of 1971, and the
United Nations Convention against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances of
1988. These three conventions attribute important functions to the Commission on Narcotic Drugs and
to the International Narcotics Control Board.”). See also Alexander Henderson, Portuguese Defiance:
Analyzing the Strenuous Relationship Between Drug Decriminalization and International Law, 24
MICH.
STATE
INT’L
L.
REV.
725,
729
(2016),
https://digitalcommons.law.msu.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1198&context=ilr.
79 Legal Framework for Drug Trafficking, U.N. OFFICE ON DRUGS AND CRIME,
https://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/treaties/ psychotropics.html (last visited Feb. 02, 2020).
80 UNITED NATIONS, supra note 78 (explaining that the 1988 Convention against Illicit Traffic in
Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances extended the regime initiated by the 1961 and 1971
Conventions).
81
Single
Convention
on
Narcotic
Drugs,
art.
2,
1961,
https://www.unodc.org/pdf/convention_1961_en.pdf. [hereinafter 1961 Convention].
82 Id. at art. 4.
83 Id. at art. 36(4) (“Nothing contained in this article shall affect the principle that the offences to which
it refers shall be defined, prosecuted and punished in conformity with the domestic law of a Party.”).
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autonomy to redefine material terms, penalties, and priorities.84 Consequently,
“it should be no surprise that, despite commitments to international legislation,
national governments still find a way to bend the law in a manner consistent with
their views.”85 Predictably, this unfaithful application came at the expense of the
Convention’s ability to accomplish its intended goals and international actors
concluded additional action would be necessary in the future.
In 1971, the U.N. decided to update its 1961 drug control framework with
the Convention on Psychotropic Substances. This Convention “establishe[d] an
international control system for psychotropic substances” and “introduced
controls over a number of synthetic drugs.”86 Although it contributed to the
extant infrastructure established by the Single Convention, the 1971 Convention
granted the CND new freedom to “place the substance concerned under a control
regime, change the control regime, or free a substance from a control regime.”87
Consequently, the CND would no longer be subject to oversight by the World
Health Organization (“WHO”) and “[b]y the mid-1980s it was apparent that
global drug abuse had reached unprecedented dimensions.”88 Despite its
drafters’ admirable goals, the 1971 Convention lacked mechanisms to hold
signatories accountable and the General Assembly tasked the CND to devise
further measures to address this concern.89
Three years of deliberation produced the 1988 U.N. Convention Against
Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances.90 The crowning
achievement of the 1988 Convention involved new drug controls that
transcended all aspects of the transactional chain, from precursor distribution at
the outset to post-sale money laundering.91 This Convention also redefined drug
trafficking as a “criminal” offense,91 a noteworthy departure from the 1961

84 David Bewley-Taylor & Martin Jelsma, Regime Change: Re-visiting the 1961 Single Convention on
Narcotic Drugs, INT’L J. OF DRUG POL’Y 72, 76 (2011) (explaining that signatories “can impose
administrative penalties, such as fines or censure, or choose to avoid penalties altogether” providing
they cite “best endeavors” to comply with the stated objectives of the Convention) (emphasis added).
85 Battiloro, supra note 14, at 364.
86 UNITED NATIONS OFFICE ON DRUGS AND CRIME, Convention on Psychotropic Substances,
https://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/treaties/psychotropics.html (last visited Feb. 07, 2020).
87 Daniel Heilman, The International Control Of Illegal Drugs And The U.N. Treaty Regime: Preventing
Or Causing Human Rights Violations?, 19 CARDOZO J. COMP. L. 237, 247 (2011),
http://biblioteca.cejamericas.org/bitstream/handle/2015/3560/cjicl_19.2_heilmann_article.pdf?seque
nce=1&isAllowed=y.
88 Id. at 248-249.
89 See generally William C. Gilmore et al., Commentary on The United Nations Convention Against
Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances, E/CN.7/590 at 1-12 (1988).
90 Convention Against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances, 28 I.L.M. 497, Dec.
19, 1988, https://www.unodc.org/pdf/convention_1988_en.pdf [hereinafter 1988 Convention].
91 See Harmonie Michelot, Shanlin Fu, et al., Effect of Drug Precursors and Chemicals Relevant to
Clandestine Laboratory Investigation on Plastic Bags Used for Collection and Storage, 273 FORENSIC
SCI. INT’L 106, 107-110 (2017) (explaining precursors are compounds or solvents used to manufacture
drugs both legal and illicit and can be difficult to detect). China is a ready distributor of fentanyl
precursors, as well as IMF. See Armenian, supra note 31, at 3 (“The rise in the production of counterfeit
pills and NPF-laced heroin and cocaine is expected to continue due to the ease of manufacturing and
readily available precursors shipped from China.”).
91 1988 Convention, supra note 90, at art. 3(2), https://www.unodc.org/pdf/convention_1988_en.pdf
(“[E]ach Party shall adopt such measures as may be necessary to establish as a criminal offence under
its domestic law, when committed intentionally, the possession, purchase or cultivation of narcotic
drugs or psychotropic substances for personal consumption contrary to the provisions of the 1961
Convention, the 1961 Convention as amended or the 1971 Convention.”) (emphasis added).
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Convention’s “punishable” offense92 language. This shift in terminology
effectively required signatories to rewrite portions of their domestic
counternarcotics statutes to comply with international law. The 1988 Convention
relied upon “the underlying philosophy . . . that improving the effectiveness of
domestic criminal justice systems in relation to drug trafficking is a precondition
for enhanced co-operation.”93 Therefore, international law scholars viewed the
1988 Convention as a bridge to future global collaboration that they hoped
would hold criminal enterprises responsible for the illicit manufacturing and
dissemination of synthetic drugs.
Consistent with their misapplication of earlier Conventions discussed
above, signatory nations interpreted the binding articles of the 1988 Convention
loosely and cited licit drug manufacturing as a justification for relaxed domestic
enforcement.94 Consequently, criminal law scholars did not observe a decrease
in international drug use after the 1988 Convention95 and, in 1998, the U.N.
General Assembly convened a Special Session (“UNGASS”) to address the
issue. The UNGASS produced a political declaration that refocused international
attention on narcotrafficking in particular.96 This Declaration “link[ed], for the
first time, the illicit production and trafficking of drugs with terrorism and arms
trafficking,” consistent with the U.N.’s drug enforcement trajectory.97 However,
although the Declaration encouraged countries to submit biannual updates to the
CND, it did not create new measures for compliance or a “formal sanction
system”; accordingly, it has been an at best “soft instrument” in the international
war on drugs.98 In addition to enforcement issues, increases in Afghani opium
production scuttled what little progress the international community did make
against global narcotrafficking.99 Therefore, charitably stated, international
entities have struggled to effectively combat the opioid epidemic.
The status quo international regime fails to thwart IMF traffickers because
it lacks sufficient means to hold offending nations accountable. This dearth of
accountability arose because the 1961 Convention and its progeny are non-selfexecuting treaties designed to appease multiple nations.100 Patil Armenian and
92 1961 Convention, supra note 81, at art. 36.
93 Heilman, supra note 87, at 250 n. 68.
94 Gilmore, supra note 89, at 296.
95 See generally Claudia Costa Storti & Paul De Grauwe, The Cocaine and Heroin Markets in the Era
of Globalization and Drug Reduction Policies, 20 INT’L J. DRUG POL’Y 488 (2009).
96 U.N. Gen. Assemb., Special Session of the General Assembly Devoted to the Countering of the World
Drug Problem Together (June 8-10, 1998), Political Declaration, Guiding Principles of Drug Demand
Reduction and Measures to Enhance International Cooperation Counter the World Drug Problem,
GAOR, 20th Spec. Sess., Supp. No. 1 (A/S-20/4), ch. V (1998), www.unodc.org/pdf/report_1999-0101_1.pdf [hereinafter Political Declaration].
97 Heilman, supra note 87, at 252.
98 Id.
99 Id.
100 Thomas Michael McDonnell, Defensively Invoking Treaties in American Courts – Jurisdictional
Challenges Under the U.N. Drug Trafficking Convention by Foreign Defendants Kidnapped Abroad
by U.S. Agents, 37 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1401, 1405 (1995) (“When domestic law requires
implementing legislation to make the provision effective locally, the treaty provision is ‘non-selfexecuting.’”); Renkel v. United States, 456 F.3d 640, 643 (6th Cir. 2006) (“‘[N]on-self-executing’
treaties do require domestic legislation to have the force of law.”). See also Bewley-Taylor, supra note
84, at 76 (“. . . the non-self- executing nature of the Convention leaves the offences and penal- ties to
be applied up to the Parties themselves.”); Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations Law of the United
States, § 111(4) (1987) (an international agreement is non-self-executing “if the agreement manifests
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his colleagues at the University of California-San Francisco explain, “[s]ince the
Single Convention is not self-executing, parties must pass laws to carry out its
provisions, and the UNODC works with countries’ legislatures to ensure
compliance.”101 The extent of such cooperation varies among nations and some
signatories either lack the ability to monitor and accurately report drug
diversion,102 or decline to enforce penalties altogether.103 Noncompliant
countries lack an incentive to comply with extant international drug conventions
because they do not face credible threats of enforceable sanctions. Thus,
although the conventions ostensibly set meaningful standards, they have
historically been—at least in practice—paper tigers. Alex Kreit, a Professor at
Thomas Jefferson School of Law, agrees. As Kreit lamented in an interview with
Forbes:
The INCB has complained for years . . . but at the end of the
day, that’s really all it can do. It doesn’t have any direct
enforcement authority over parties to the Single Convention.
All it can do is say ‘you’re out of compliance’ and, at worst,
recommend that other treaty parties stop the import/export of
drugs to the countries it doesn’t like.104
Such lax authority also allows China to selectively enforce, and therefore
circumvent, international law without risk of repercussion from the INCB.105
Conversely, as explained by intellectual property attorney T. Rao Coca, bilateral
treaties are easier to enforce than multilateral conventions because they can be
arbitrated.106 Bilateral treaties also facilitate key law enforcement cooperation
that may reduce the chances of material breach. They have been described as
“the most important” part of a U.S.-China counternarcotic strategy.107 Therefore,
any solution to the global opioid crisis must not only recognize, but also focus

an intention that it shall not become effective as domestic law without the enactment of implementing
legislation”).
101 Armenian, et al., supra note 31, at 124-125.
102 See generally INTERNATIONAL DRUG CONTROL IN THE 21ST CENTURY CH. 5 (Hamid Ghodse, ed.,
Ashgate Pub. 2008).
103 Battiloro, supra note 14, at 364 (“For example, despite its illegality, the Netherlands eluded
international law regarding recreational marijuana use by fostering a policy of non-enforcement.”). See
generally Henderson, supra note 78, at 754-56 (explaining how Portugal decriminalized illegal drugs,
a decision which may violate Article 3(2) of the 1988 Convention).
104 Jacob Sullum, As Drug War Dissent Mounts, U.N. Agency Rails Against Reforms It Cannot Stop,
FORBES (2014), https://www.forbes.com/sites/jacobsullum/2014/03/07/as-criticism-of-the-war-ondrugs-mounts-a-u-n-agency-rails-against-reforms-it-is-powerless-to-stop/#78524bef5056.
105 Battiloro, supra note 14, at 365 (explaining that relaxed enforcement has “also provide[d] wiggle
room for China to permit chemical companies to continue exploiting regulatory weaknesses for
economic advantage.”).
106 T. Rao Coca, Multilateral vs. Bilateral Trade Agreement: Which is better for U.S. Economy?, LAS
VEGAS BUS. PRESS (Jan. 2, 2018, 8:56 AM), https://businesspress.vegas/columns/expertscorner/multilateral-vs-bilateral-trade-agreement-which-is-better-for-u-s-economy/ (“The advantages
of a bilateral agreement is that it is easier to negotiate since it involves only two countries; goes into
effect faster, reaping trade benefits more quickly. They are easier to enforce, particularly if arbitration
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107 YANG SHAOWEN, INTERNATIONAL POLICE COOPERATION: A WORLD PERSPECTIVE 132 (1996)
(“Bilateral cooperation is the most important part of all. As of early 1998, the Chinese government has
signed agreements with the governments of Russia, Mexico, India, and Pakistan to fight the illegal
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174

NOTRE DAME J. INT’L & COMP. L.

vol. XI:1

upon, China as the world’s primary manufacturer of IMF, its analogues, and
fentanyl precursors and then take responsible steps toward accountability for the
regime.108
V. PROPOSED SOLUTION
A. BILATERAL TREATY
The United States and China should adopt a bilateral treaty that would
render legally enforceable the categorical and permanent treatment of fentanyl
analogues as the equivalent of Schedule I controlled substances.109 The parties
should explicitly declare their mutual intention for the treaty to self-execute.110
Effective May 1, 2019, China “add[ed] fentanyl-related substances to a
supplementary list of controlled narcotic drugs and psychotropic substances with
non-medical use.”111 This action, in conjunction with DEA’s temporary
emergency scheduling order, “has resulted in a significant decrease in direct
Chinese-origin fentanyl-related substances being encountered in the United
States since Fiscal Year 2019.”112 Amanda Liskamm, counsel for the Criminal
Division at DOJ, explained in a hearing before the U.S. House of
Representatives in January 2020 that:
DEA expects savvy clandestine manufactures and traffickers
to respond to the re-emerging gap in U.S. law by again
producing novel fentanyl-related substances. This is the
normal response of traffickers who wish to avoid prosecution
and still profit from peddling poison and is consistent with
previous attempts to circumvent reactive substance-specific
control measures.113
These synthetic analogues have ravaged the United States, claiming
thousands of lives.114 Federal law enforcement clearly understands the need to

108 Knierim, supra note 23, at 2.
109 Fentanyl Analogues: Perspectives on Classwide Scheduling, Hearing Before the U.S. House
Subcomm. on Crime, Terrorism, and Homeland Security, 116 Cong. 6 (2020) (Statement by Amanda
Liskamm,
Counsel,
Criminal
Division,
U.S.
Dep’t
of
Justice),
https://docs.house.gov/meetings/JU/JU08/20200128/110392/HHRG-116-JU08-Wstate-LiskammA20200128.pdf, (“The class of fentanyl-related substances needs to be categorically and permanently
scheduled.”).
110 Treaties “are not domestic law unless Congress has either enacted implementing statutes or the treaty
itself conveys an intention that it be self-executing.” Medellín v. Texas, 552 U.S. 491, 505 (2008)
(citing Igartua–De La Rosa v. United States, 417 F.3d 145, 150 (C.A.1 2005)) (emphasis added).
111 Yanping Bao, Shiqiu Meng, et al., Control of Fentanyl-Related Substances in China, THE LANCET
(July 2019), https://www.thelancet.com/pdfs/journals/lanpsy/PIIS2215-0366(19)30218-4.pdf.
112 Liskamm, supra note 109, at 2.
113 Id. at 5.
114 The Countdown: Fentanyl Analogues and the Expiring Emergency Scheduling Order, Hearing
Before the U.S. Sen. Comm. on the Judiciary, 116 Cong. 5 (2019) (Statement by Kemp L. Chester,
U.S.
Office
of
Nat’l
Drug
Control
Pol’y),
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2017, 1,685 deaths involved a fentanyl analogue with the most common analogues being carfentanil
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close this loophole in U.S. law; the DOJ’s ongoing efforts to stymie synthetic
opioid proliferation depend on it. Fifty-two state attorneys general from both
major political parties have also voiced support for class-wide scheduling of
fentanyl analogues.115 The proposed treaty would adopt the language of China’s
class-wide fentanyl scheduling measure116 and permanently extend the
temporary U.S. scheduling order.117
B. ASCENSION WOULD BE IN CHINA’S INTERESTS
Claims that China would balk at this treaty are erroneous. First, while the
treaty may establish a new layer of accountability for China to enforce its 2019
scheduling measure, it would not create additional obligations beyond what the
regime imposed upon itself in 2019. Rather, the proposed treaty would allow the
United States to hold China accountable in international court for failures to
enforce its own class-wide scheduling order.118 Because China has already
pledged to enforce this mandate, failure to sign a treaty designed to accomplish
that exact purpose would raise questions about the sincerity of that pledge and
further undermine the regime’s global legitimacy. Therefore, soft power and
reputational reasons may, perhaps on their own, be sufficient to facilitate
China’s adoption of a treaty.
Second, in recent months China has demonstrated a clear willingness to
cooperate with the United States to curtail opioid proliferation.119 In 2019,
China relied upon a tip provided by American intelligence to identify and
subsequently prosecute Chinese nationals involved in illicit fentanyl or fentanyl-

(637), furanyl fentanyl (365), and cyclopropyl fentanyl (210). In Maine, in the first six months of 2018,
fentanyl analogues were involved in 37 deaths, with acetyl fentanyl and methoxyacetyl fentanyl being
the most common. In Ohio, between January and February of 2017 alone, 48 percent (135) of all drug
deaths involved acryl fentanyl, 31 percent (87) involved furanyl fentanyl, and eight percent (22)
involved carfentanil.”).
115 Letter to Congressional Leaders, NAT. ASSOC. OF ATTORNEYS GEN. (2018),
https://www.naag.org/assets/
redesign/files/sign-on-letter/Letter%20to%20Congress%20%20SOFA%20 Act%208.23 .pdf. (“We, the undersigned Attorneys General, write to express our
support for swift passage of the Stopping Overdoses of Fentanyl Analogues (SOFA) Act . . . The SOFA
Act will eliminate the current loophole which keeps the controlled substance scheduling system one
step behind those who manufacture fentanyl analogues and then introduce these fentanyl analogues
into the opioid supply.”).
116 Liskamm, supra note 11, at 1-2.
117 Liskamm, supra note 109, at 3; Andrew Cass, President Signs Bill Extending Emergency
Classification for Fentanyl Analogs, NEWS HERALD (Feb. 7, 2020), https://www.newsherald.com/news/president-signs-bill-extending-emergency-classification-for-fentanylanalogs/article_ecca071c-4940-11ea-832b-f36a43153559.html.
118 Self-executing treaties are judicially enforceable because they carry the force of domestic law. See
Stephen P. Mulligan, International Law and Agreements: Their Effect upon U.S. Law, RL 32528,
CONG. RES. SERV. 2 (last updated Sept. 19, 2018), https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/RL32528.pdf (“Selfexecuting treaties have a status equal to federal statute, superior to U.S. state law, and inferior to the
Constitution.”).
119 Cui Tiankai, Chinese Ambassador: We are Doing Our Part to Combat the Opioid Crisis, USA
TODAY (Sept. 30, 2019, 12:21 PM), https://www.usatoday.com/story/opinion/2019/09/30/chineseambassador-we-are-helping-combat-opioid-crisis-column/2291440001/ (“China stands ready to
cooperate and coordinate further with the U.S. on the highly complicated issue of fentanyl-like
substance abuse. This must be done on the basis of mutual respect and understanding, not misplaced
accusations and unfair recrimination. Working closely on this issue—which touches the lives of
millions of Americans—also demonstrates China’s continued efforts for a stronger relationship.”).
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related enterprises.120 The Chinese court that heard the case imposed the harshest
sentences allowable.121 This sentencing approach should be applauded by law
enforcement in the United States because “[a]s a result, fewer Chinese vendors
are willing to export fentanyl products, according to DHS/Homeland Security
Investigations’ transnational organized crime office.”122 China has also
cooperated with the United States in other ways regarding IMF specifically.
Celina Realuyo, a professor specializing in the study of organized crime at the
National Defense University, explained in January 2020 that, “[t]hanks to more
postal service scrutiny and increased U.S.-China cooperation to stem the flow of
illicit fentanyl into the United States, the number of drug seizures involving
high-purity fentanyl sent via mail from China dropped precipitously in 2019.”123
This cooperation provides further indicia that China would be willing to enter a
bilateral treaty with the United States that addresses the transboundary harms
caused by IMF diversion and trafficking.
A bilateral self-executing treaty would benefit the United States in
several ways. Most importantly, the DOJ would reassume its legal authority to
prosecute traffickers of fentanyl analogues, when traceable to China, just as if
Congress had permanently incorporated such analogues into Schedule I.
Consequently, the treaty could facilitate efforts by the DOJ to focus on the
geographical source of IMF and, by virtue of territorial-effects jurisdiction,124
prosecute any illicit manufacturers China does not—a necessary backstop. Even
with China’s 2019 scheduling order, the regime’s enforcement capabilities
remain at best lackluster. Thus, “[u]nilateral action will have no influence on an
industry that remains a step ahead of the law.”125 Fortunately for China, the
United States may be in a position to help. Alex Palmer, an investigative
journalist, explains:
The agency responsible for overseeing production of drugs and
detecting malfeasance in China is understaffed and
overwhelmed: As of 2017, there were around 2,000 inspectors
at the agency, and they conducted a total of only 751
inspections that year, a minuscule figure compared with the
enormousness of the industry. In the United States, law
enforcement and prosecutors have the tools to react quickly to
the rise of new copycat drugs that could be used for illicit
purposes.126

120 Bill Chappell, China Jails 9 in Fentanyl Trafficking Case That Began with a Tip from the U.S., NPR
(Nov. 7, 2019, 11:15 AM), https://www.npr.org/2019/11/07/777173066/china-jails-9-in-fentanyltrafficking-case-that-began-with-a-u-s-tip.
121 Id. (“The Xingtai Intermediate People’s Court in Hebei province imposed the most severe penalties
on three people accused of leading the ring.”).
122 Realuyo, supra note 53, at 6.
123 Id.
124 Geoffrey R. Watson, Offenders Abroad: The Case for Nationality-Based Criminal Jurisdiction, 17
YALE J. INT’L L. 41, 60 (1992) (“[T]he territorial-effects principle applies to crimes committed in
foreign states that have a discernible effect on U.S. territory. The importation of narcotics or other
contraband is the paradigmatic example.”).
125 Battiloro, supra note 14, at 374.
126 Palmer, supra note 41, at 4.
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Thus, the proposed treaty would serve the national interests of both the
United States and China. The United States would be able to hold Chinese
chemists accountable for illicit diversion of fentanyl analogues and China would
enjoy drug enforcement assistance in its purported crackdown on synthetic
opioids. Predictably, Chinese chemists would become much less likely to
continue illicit diversion practices.127 For example, as one such chemist
explained in February 2019: “Anything [China] schedules, we don’t sell. As
long as it is scheduled, we won’t sell it. If it’s not scheduled, we can sell it.”128
Therefore, one might infer that the downward trend in fentanyl diversion that
emerged in the wake of China’s 2019 class-wide scheduling order would
continue with additional law enforcement scrutiny by the United States and
international partners.
Although the United States has been hit the hardest by opioid overdoses
among developed nations, it is not alone.129 The proposed treaty, in conjunction
with other forms of bilateral cooperation, promises the missing link in
accountability to ensure that China honors its 2019 pledge to control fentanyl
analogues, especially in a world which “has taught Beijing that faking selfaccountability while contesting criticism is a safe strategy.”130 A bilateral treaty
between the United States and China would also benefit other nations that have
been ravaged by transboundary fentanyl trafficking. When less illicit fentanyl
flows from its primary source, transboundary harm to residents of other nations
predictably decreases.131
C. DOMESTIC LAW ALONE INSUFFICIENT
Criticisms alleging that Congress can solve this crisis on its own are
misplaced for three reasons. First, although the United States temporarily
extended its Schedule I classification of fentanyl analogues on February 6, 2020,
it did so only for fifteen months, at which time Congress must revisit the
question.132 Such temporary scheduling is inadequate because it routinely
subjects DOJ drug control efforts to the uncertainty wrought by turbulent
political tides by demanding that the agency perennially devote resources to
lobbying for the renewal of the same policy.133 This process not only squanders
127 Realuyo, supra note 124, at 6.
128 WESTHOFF, supra note 20, at 227.
129 See generally 2020 World Drug Report, U.N. OFFICE ON DRUGS AND CRIME 11-17,
https://wdr.unodc.org/wdr2020/field/WDR20_Booklet_3.pdf (last visited Dec. 01, 2020) (explaining
the vast spread of the opioid crisis across Europe, the Middle East, and Latin America).
130 Josh Rogin, The U.S. Shouldn’t Take China at Its Word on Fentanyl, WASH. POST (May 23, 2019,
7:58 AM), https://www.washington post.com/opinions/2019/05/23/us-shouldnt-take-china-its-wordfentanyl/.
131 Fentanyl Ban in China to Expand to All Drugs Related to the Killer Synthetic Opioid, CBS NEWS
(Apr. 1, 2019, 5:46 AM), https://www.cbsnews.com/news/fentanyl-china-to-ban-opioids-relateddrug-blamed-most-us-overdose-deaths/ (“Data from the U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration have
shown that when China bans a variant of fentanyl, seizures of that analog in the U.S. fall.”). See also
Vanda Felbab-Brown, Fentanyl and Geopolitics: Controlling the Opioid Supply from China,
BROOKINGS INST. (July 2020), https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2020/07/8_FelbabBrown_China_final.pdf (explaining China as the primary source for IMF).
132 Cass, supra note 117.
133 Congress Must Act to Ban Lethal Drugs, U.S. Dep’t of Justice (Jan. 31, 2020),
https://www.justice.gov/usao-wdmo/pr/congress-must-act-permanently-ban-lethal-drugs (“Beyond
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American taxpayer dollars in needless bureaucratic squabbles, but it also risks
the declassification of fentanyl analogues after fifteen months.134 Such
declassification would deprive the DOJ of necessary prosecutorial authority to
bring narcotraffickers to justice.
Second, a bilateral treaty promises territorial-effects jurisdiction that would
enable the prosecution of chemists in China who profit from drug diversion that
harms Americans.135 Domestic law alone cannot realize this benefit and, because
most illicit fentanyl originates in China, it would inevitably be less effective
because it lacks jurisdiction over the source. Moreover, a unilateral solution
would forego diplomatic opportunities to cooperate with Chinese law
enforcement. Therefore, whereas domestic law can mitigate the symptoms of the
opioid crisis, a bilateral treaty would be of special benefit because it proposes to
address the problem at its source.
Finally, ratification of the proposed treaty could occur with a simple twothirds majority vote in the U.S. Senate.136 The Senate unanimously renewed
temporary IMF analogue scheduling in January 2020 for fifteen months,137
unlike the House of Representatives where 88 members opposed the measure.138
While the Republican Senate may have preferred to permanently schedule
fentanyl analogues, prudence prevented it from doing so. Pressed against the
February 6, 2020 deadline, the Senate had no choice but to “water down”
legislation that would have permanently scheduled fentanyl analogues139 to
“appease Democrats’ concerns”.140 Given the now bipartisan support for
permanent scheduling in the Senate,141 it appears likely that the chamber would
ratify a bilateral treaty that accomplishes this purpose—particularly when

this temporary extension, a permanent legislative solution for class-wide fentanyl scheduling is
necessary so that we don’t find ourselves in this position again, on the brink of opening the floodgates
to drug traffickers.”).
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note 51 and accompanying text.
135 Watson, supra note 125, at 60.
136 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
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138 See Lynch, supra note 49 (explaining ratification of the temporary schedule by “a vote of 320-88.”).
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senators need not appease the ultra-progressive political factions that exert an
outsized influence in the House of Representatives.
VI. CONCLUSION
A bilateral self-executing treaty between the United States and China would
mark a step forward for diplomacy between the two superpowers and serve
longstanding international drug enforcement interests by targeting fentanyl
analogues at their distribution point. While some literature on this subject
recommends more of the same failed multinational conventions,142 the
alternative proposed here is novel for its tailored focus and simple philosophy:
target the source and control the flow. Moreover, 2021 presents a unique
opportunity for drug control efforts to acquire a place of prominence in U.S.China relations, as evinced by new prosecutorial cooperation that has emerged
from recent trade talks.143
This Note recognizes that its proposed treaty promises only a first step in
global efforts to combat transboundary fentanyl proliferation. This proposal does
not market itself as—nor would it be appropriately labeled—a silver bullet in
the global “War on Drugs” (so-called). Additional measures would also be
important for the treaty to yield optimal results. The United States and China, in
conjunction with international partners, should also consider regulation of
fentanyl precursors, many of which originate in China and are subsequently
disseminated to American consumers through Mexico.144 Accordingly, federal
law enforcement would benefit from additional cooperation between DOJ
entities and the Mexican Government to control transboundary trafficking in
fentanyl, its analogues, precursors, and other drugs.145 Finally, and most
importantly, China must take clear action to close loopholes in its drug control
regime. Kai Pflug, a consultant in the Chinese chemical industry, explained to
the New York Times that drug diversion will persist in some variety until China
ramps up supervision over its chemical industry.146 Research into such reforms
must occur without delay.

142 Most such recommendations do not prescribe particular reforms; they merely suggest “stronger”
treaties. Contrariwise, the treaty proposed here would schedule all fentanyl analogues, as already
scheduled permanently in China and temporarily in the United States, consistent with the Schedule I
requirements of the CSA as a matter of international law. See Battiloro, supra note 14, at 374 (“A
stronger international convention needs to be established that unifies all countries under the same
obligations and reduces opportunity to exploit loopholes.”).
143 Rachel Layne, Joint U.S.-China Opioid Smuggling Bust Could Speed Trade Deal, CBS NEWS (Nov.
5, 2019, 5:44 PM), https://www.cbsnews.com/news/us-china-opioid-smuggling-bust-could-speedtrade-deal/ (“Signs of cooperation between the U.S. and China to halt illegal shipments of opioids
bodes well for a possible trade deal between the world's two largest economies, analysts said.”).
144 WESTHOFF, supra note 20, at 226.
145 Steven Dudley et al., Mexico’s Role in the Deadly Rise of Fentanyl, WILSON CTR. (Feb. 2019), https://
www.wilsoncenter.org/sites/default/files/media/documents/publication/fentanyl_insight_crime_final
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of addressing the problem of the drug in Mexico and in the United States.”).
146 Sui-Lee Wee & Javier C. Hernandez, Despite Trump’s Plea’s, China’s Online Opioid Bazaar is
Booming, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 8, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/11/08/world/asia/china-opioidtrump.html.
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Synthetic opioids marked a turning point in the opioid crisis, both in
America and around the world. Despite best efforts and noble intentions by the
international community and the United States to curtail the epidemic, illicit
opioid abuse has only worsened in recent years with an estimated over 30,000
deaths directly attributable to synthetic opioid overdoses in 2018.147 Recent trade
talks between the United States and China, combined with DOJ’s interest in
class-wide scheduling, has rendered the present a pristine opportunity for
transnational cooperation on this important issue. Unlike many challenges of our
day, the opioid crisis affects people around the world and from among every
social class, from renowned musicians like Prince148 to everyday Americans
such as Adam Moser. The urgency of this crisis presents a unique opportunity
for bipartisanship in America149 and global cooperation among rival
superpowers.150 This Note proposes a solution that would not only revolutionize
the public policy conversation about synthetic opioids, but also chart a new and
sustainable path forward. Adoption of the recommendations herein discussed
would optimize diplomacy between the United States and China, potentially
saving countless lives.
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than heroin. Breathing can stop after use of just two milligrams of fentanyl. That’s about as much as
trace amounts of table salt.”) (emphasis added)).
148 Silva, supra note 4.
149 See Graham-Feinstein Press Release, supra note 142.
150 See Jiang & Wescott, supra note 65.

